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INTRODUCTION
Adversaries threaten the United States throughout a complex battlespace…spanning the global commons…Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack. Other adversaries take advantage of ungoverned space and under-governed territories from which they prepare plans, train forces and launch attacks. These ungoverned areas often coincide with locations of illicit activities: such coincidence creates opportunities for hostile coalitions of criminal elements and ideological extremists.
National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004
The United States National Military Strategy clearly articulates the diverse global threats that face the United States, but the Department of Defense (DOD) has not implemented a process to deal with these adversaries effectively. Current threats involving transnational and non-state actors operate across the Areas of Responsibility (AOR) of multiple combatant commands. In order to deal with these threats, there must be a single DOD entity empowered to globally integrate and prioritize targeting.
Combatant commanders (CCDRs) are assigned a wide range of missions such as conducting Global Strike, waging the Global War on Terrorism, supporting counter-narcotic operations, and countering weapons proliferation. In some of these mission areas, the combatant commander's geographic boundaries are insufficient to clearly delineate where one combatant commander's responsibilities end and another combatant commander's begins. Therefore, it is imperative that the DOD adapts in order to cover the seams created where global networks are formed to threaten United States interests. Current doctrine is insufficient to address these complex networks which link adversary states, terrorists, narcotics dealers, international criminal organizations, financiers, weapons proliferators, and individual non-state actors.
Although the military has the capability to find, fix, and track many of these threats, the DOD lacks the legal authorities to target and engage many of them. Often the threats exist in sovereign nations outside of designated combat zones and are criminal vice military in nature. An interagency process must be an integral part of resolving this targeting issue, but the DOD needs to first establish a body to function as the global targeting synchronizer within the DOD.
Establishing a global strategic targeting organization within the DOD to better address transnational threats is a critical requirement. A history of how and why the current doctrine and structure has evolved is vital to understanding the deficiencies of the military's current organization. It is important to recognize that future targeting organizations be created with the necessary authorities to carry out future missions across the globe, unrestricted by geographic boundaries. By implementing a global strategic targeting system, based on Joint Targeting doctrine, the DOD will better synchronize targeting between the unified commands and streamline the decision loop. apply. By coordinating these functions and maintaining these lists, the JTCB assures proper de-confliction, prioritizes allocation of resources, identifies shortfalls, and applies appropriate restraints into the targeting system. This provides centralized command and facilitates decentralized execution while preventing duplicative efforts.
BACKGROUND
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Targets should be developed from the lowest levels of the chain of command based on their assigned objectives. Subordinate commanders must be able to nominate targets in their area of responsibility (AOR) which they do not have the resources or authority to prosecute. To prevent fratricide and unintended consequences, one final tenet is required; in order to engage targets in another command's AOR, actions must be coordinated through the command that owns the area. This problem is compounded when the regional CCDR's missions are added into the mix.
STRATCOM could divert targeting resources away from a supported CCDR to conduct their own missions, even if STRATCOM is attempting to act impartially. Due to the missions and forces assigned to them, STRATCOM is the de facto prioritization authority for numerous national targeting resources. In addition to its role as DOD synchronizer for combating WMD, it also controls national-level resources for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; network warfare; and information operations. STRATCOM's implied authority for apportioning these assets could upset a regional CCDR. This friction would mirror how Army and Marine commanders felt about the JFACC during the first Gulf war.
Arguably, the DOD did not intend to put STRATCOM in this position of authority.
Another major area of concern is cross-boundary operations. In a 2000 Joint Forces Quarterly article, Richard Lechowich from U.S. Central Command's Directorate of Plans and Policy captured the challenges combatant commanders are presented with:
Drugs originating in the CENTCOM area of responsibility could be detected by SPACECOM, survive crop eradication, and be tracked across the AOR in transit to EUCOM for transshipment. EUCOM would then monitor the movement while alerting friendly law enforcement agencies. Finally, either SOUTHCOM or U.S. Joint Forces Command could help domestic law enforcement agencies interdict the shipment and arrest the perpetrators…Crossing the invisible boundaries that separate CINC responsibilities is perhaps even more difficult today than when Clauswitz first formalized the concept of friction. Such battlefield seams as cross-boundary situations are a weak point for enemy exploitation. Commanders on all levels will still have to spend additional effort to ensure that these seams are covered.
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Cross-boundary and interagency operations in a post-9/11 world are just as 
CONCLUSION
For a strategic targeting process to work and not just create another unnecessary layer of bureaucracy, several initial conditions must be met. Foremost, strategic leaders must understand and conform to the principle of centralized command -decentralized execution.
Targeting planners must move past the "warheads on foreheads" mentality and understand how to incorporate all instruments of national power. To effectively accomplish this, a Strategic-JTCB must include representatives from all USG agencies. Finally, to produce synchronized target lists the combatant commands need to adopt a common targeting database.
The DOD will see many benefits if a Strategic Joint Target Coordination Board is established. Strategic targeting will be better matched to USG objectives and the high demand -low density national-level targeting resources will be better managed. There will be improved synchronization and de-confliction of operations between CCDRs. Combatant commands access to all-source intelligence and resources of other U. S. Government Agencies will be enhanced; which will ultimately lead to an accelerated decision loop and authorities approval process.
In conclusion, because combatant commanders are conducting targeting independently a myriad of networked adversaries are able to exploit porous seams. In order to better combat these adversaries it is imperative that the DOD implement changes based on 
